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"NEW-NOTHINGS,"
NEOLOGISMS, AND THE
RECOINAGE OF 1696
Sandra Sherman

aniel Defoe's An Essay Upon Projects (1697) is an early,
1remarkable text addressing financial conditions followig the Seven Years War. It proposes initiatives
("Projects...of publick Advantage") to build roads, care for
widows and sailors, discover bankrupts' estates, organize banks,
run a lottery and, inter alia, house fools by taxing mental
labor.^ Each project aigues for improvement over things as
^ Defoe's "Projects," intended for "publick" advantage, were to be privately
financed. If a projector arted on "the honest Basis of Ingenuity and Improvement,"
he could "aim primarily at his own Advantage, yet with the circumstances of
Public Benefit added." See An Essay Upon Projects (London, 1697), 10-11. P.
Bastian discusses the Essay in Defoe's Early Life (Totowa: Barnes & Noble, 1981),
195-200, as does Paula Backscheider in Daniel Defoe; His Life (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1989), 68-70. Bastian su^ests that Defoe's projects
were ahead of their time since they depended on a strong central executive, but
that they soon became impracticable as a wave of laissez-faire enterprise made
centrally-managed initiatives less appealing. Backscheider examines the text in
context with the prevailing economic crisis. For a detailed examination of the
effects of the war on merchants (whom Defoe claims "did not apprehend the
Danger to be really what it was" [4j), see D. W. Jones, "London Merchants and
the Crisis of the 1690's," in Crisis and Order in English Towns, lSOO-1700, ed. Peter
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they are: the text is about innovation. The "publick
Advantage" it promotes assumes the infrastructural needs of
emergent capitalism, and it acknowledges capitalist motivation
in underwriting public works ("What Profit to the Undertakers?
For we must allow them to Gain, and that Considerably, or no
Man wou'd undertake Such a Work").^ Yet Defoe's disposition
towards "Gain" is tempered, averse to profitors that profiteer.
He distinguishes innovation from scams, citing
a great difference between New Inventions and Projects,
between Improvement of Manufactures or Lands, which
tend to the immediate Benefit of the Public and Imploying of the Poor; and Projects fram'd by subtle Heads,
with a sort of a Deceptio Visus and Legerdemain, to bring
People to run needless and unusual hazards. (15)
In this essay, I argue that Defoe's commitment to genuine,
public-spirited innovation, freed from deceptive projectors who
snatch one's funds, is allied with his project to free English
usage from eccentric, innovating neologism.^ Underlying both
Clark and Paul Slack (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 311-55. On
Defoe's life-long career as a projector, see John Robert Moore, Daniel Defoe:
Citizen of the Modem World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 283-305.
The text is rarely treated as a literary artifact, but see Cynthia Wall, "'Her
Conversation heavenly': Defoe's Architectural Dialogues and the Academy for
Women," in Compendious Conversations: The Method of Dialogue in the Early
Enlightenment, ed. Kevin L. Cope (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1992), 237-48.
^ An Essay, 106. The chapter on "The History of Projects" cites the "hardship for
a man to be Master of so fine a Thought, that had both the Essential Ends of a
Project in it.—Publick Good and Private Advantage-, and that the Publick shou'd
reap the benefit, and the Author be left out; the Injustice of which, no doubt,
discourag'd many a Good Design" (28).
' In proposing an economic/literary ahgnment both to analyze texts and theorize
conditions of cultural production, my method approaches James Thompson's in
"'Sure I Have Seen That Face Before': Representation and Value in EighteenthCentury Drama," in Cultural Readings of Restoration and Eighteenth-Century
Theater, ed. J. Douglas Canfield and Deborah Payne (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1995), 281-308. Thompson connects economic and social theory
"specifically in relation to the concept of value," exploring the ways in which "two
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is an animus toward representations—words—that represent
nothing, simulacra that dissipate meaning (or good sense) in the
ephemera of nonce-words.'' Defoe cites affinities that link stock
jobbing (projects "blown up by the air of great Words"[13]),
expletives, and upstart speech into a unified field of dissolute,
literally dissolving language. The market, conversation, and
literature evince a common vice. Defoe's project for a Society
to renovate English, to purge it of vapid innovation, is a parallel
expression (to his blast at jobbery) of a single concern: words
evade meaning, aggrandize their users.' His rhetorical politics
different discourses, political economy and comedy, work through a method of
reading, a model for determining 'face value.'" In making this connection,
Thompson does not argue that the economy "causes" a type of comedic discourse,
but rather that both are "relatively autonomous discursive formations determined
by specific historical conditions" (281, 282). I argue that puffery and innovation
in the market, innovation and linguistic irregularity in literature and conversation,
condense into a field of opacity condemned by the Essay, instantiating a recoil from
unchecked privatization.
•* As opposed to "representation," simulation "substitut[es] signs of the real for the
real itself," cancelling referentiality, hence originality. It produces a field of
apprehension "sheltered from...any distinaion between the real and the imaginary."
See "The Precession of Simulacra" in Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, trans. Paul
Foss, Paul Patton, Phihp Beitchman (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983), 1-79, 4. As
Baudrillard observes, simulation is "the generation by models of a real without
origin or reahty" (2).
' Defoe's support/suspicion of innovation is embedded in a discourse marked by
ambivalence. J. S. Peters observes that "a nvunber of seemingly tmrelated
historical conditions and metaphoric habits are part of the story of the general
cultural interest in novelty (and the accompanying suspicion of it) in the late
seventeenth century." See "The Novelty; Or, Money, Fashion, Getting, Spending,
and Glut," in Cultural Readings, ed. J. Douglas Canfield and Deborah Payne,
169-94, 170. In the Essay, the relative weighing of innovative, desirable projeas,
false innovation, and neologism tropes the perplexed view of novelty that Peters
cites. Defoe's association of newness with the ephemeral and unrehable parallels
the attimde of a print culture catering to popular demand. In "'News, and new
Things': Contemporaneity and the Early Enghsh Novel," Critical Inquiry 14
(1988), 493-515, J. Paul Himter observes that in the late seventeenth century, "the
preoccupation with novelty...developed in one of its aspects into pure emphemeral
silliness. Publishing ventures, including most of Dunton's, often tried to read
fickle public taste in the simplest and most obvious ways. A proliferation of
anonymous ballads, broadsides, narratives of public and private intrigue,
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privileges "publick Advantage"; it opposes privatized speech
that destabilizes meaning for private profit (of jobbers or
authors). At a metaphoric level, his assault on linguistic
innovation is troped by false "coining," debasement of a
standard (of value, sense, good taste) to suit a private whim.
I shall suggest that Defoe's concatenation of coins and words
applies to language the contest over valuation that arose during
the "recoinage crisis" of the 1690's, when Parliament finally
recalled clipped, devalued coins that along with counterfeits had
debased the money supply.^ In the Essay's logic, the Society is
a type of mint. It stamps out words whose value derives from
intrinsic content, rather than public acceptance (clipped coins
continued to circulate), whose value (as to each piece and in
gross) would endure (milling prevented clipping and made
counterfeiting harder). My point is that the metaphoric
exchange between words and money that informs the Essay has
a specific material basis, which Defoe evokes so as to ground his
project in exemplary "publick Advantage." Finally, I argue that
the Essay perceives wholesale public acceptance, "custom," as
inimical to linguistic integrity. The Society's rationale rests on
a paradox; "custom" sanctions non-signifying words, the
prophecies, criminal confessions, and other ephemera took events and rumors of
the street and returned them to the street in printed form" (494-95). Newness,
embodied in two-peimy throw-aways (aimed at "an ever-intensifying attention to
the latest news or pseudonews" [499]), might be less truthful than appealing, but
profitable anyway.
' The recoinage crisis lent itself to conservationist cultural critique. Richard KroU
observes that "in 1696 [John] Evelyn links [medals'] pecuhar weight as culmral
currency (with its attendant metaphors of ciroilation and potential inflation) to the
current debate on the coinage." Kroll suggests that Evelyn's gathering up all the
medals he could find "seeks at a culmral level to resist the decline of value in 'this
mercantile nation' by 'chpping, debasing, and all other imrighteous ways of
perverting the species.'" See The Material Word: Literate Culture in the Restoration
and Early Eighteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991),
178, citing Evelyn's Correspondence. Evelyn's critique extended specifically to the
mistreatment of words. KroU notes that Evelyn was "painfully conscious" that his
book on medals Ijdumismata, 1697), which was riddled was printer's errors, was
"subject to a process of chpping and debasing" (178).
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community promotes non-communication. Defoe urges that
"custom" be suppressed, words implanted with a value
unmediated by a devaluing consensus. The last part of this
essay compares Defoe's animus toward the "custom" of nonsignifying speech both in the Essay and in A New Test of the
Sence of the Nation (1710). The later text transposes to the
political context (swearing meaningless oaths of allegiance) ideas
raised in the Essay with respect to politeness (swearing
meaningless expletive oaths). I will suggest, however, that in A
New Test the money/language nexus is still emergent, in that
lurking behind "custom" (which Defoe feminizes) is her exact
contemporary, the imperious Lady Credit.

In An Essay Upon Projects, Defoe distinguishes between "the
Honest and the Dishonest" project, implicating deceptive speech
in the promotion of chimerical invention:
There are, and that too many, fair pretences of fine
Discoveries, new Inventions, Engines, and I know not
what, which, being advanc'd in Notion, and talk'd up to
great things to be perform'd when such and such Sums of
Money shall be advanc'd and such and such Engines are
made, have rais'd the Fancies of Credulous People. (11)
The object of jobbery is "talk'd up," "new Inventions" projected
into a fancied future of "things" that words seem to (but do
not) represent. As a result,
on the shadow of Expectation [the jobbers] have form'd
Companies, chose Committees, appointed Officers,
Shares, and Books, rais'd great Stocks, and cri'd up an
empty Notion to that degree, that People have been
betray'd to part with their Money for Shares in a NewNothing. (12)
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What had been "talk'd up" is hyperbolized, "cri'd up." The
"empty Notion" advanced by profiteers is blown up by elevated,
empty speech. Such speech is mere vapor, a non-representation
shrouding a non-entity, a "New-Nothing." That something can
be "new" and "nothing," an invention that does not exist,
submits market language to paradox.
To unravel the
metaphysics of such paradox requires that language call
"Fancies" into being, while referring to no referent in the world
of phenomena.'' The involvement of pretended innovation,
fancied existence, and the dissipative tendency of marketplace
speech, emerges in the image of commercialized clouds:
When the Inventors have carri'd on the Jest till they have
Sold all their own Interest, they leave the Cloud to vanish
of it self, and the poor Purchasers to Quarrel with one
another, and go to Law about Settlements, Transferrings,
and some Bone or other thrown among 'em by the
Subtlety of the Author, to lay the blame of the Miscar
riage upon themselves. (12)
As the invented Cloud decondenses back into air, the only
reality left is the investors' "Quarrel," the words of disap
pointed dupes who mistook simulacra for the real. NewNothings, and the words of projectors who talked them up,
share a logic of evanescence. Such speech, like a cloud, is
transient as projects it pretends to represent.
' The notion of outsize, empty words was of course not new. In 1650, Thomas
Hobbes observed that "there be so many wordes in use at this day in the Enghsh
tongue, that though of magnifique sound, yet (like the windy bhsters of a troubled
water) have no sense at all." See "The Answer of Mr Hobbes to Sr Will.
Davenant's Preface Before Gondibert," in Sir Willaim Davenant's Gondibert ed.,
David Glandish (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 52. Defoe, however, cites
"windy bhsters" on troubled financial waters, a trope that became commonplace
after the South Sea Bubble. A type of New-Nothing is invoked in A Modest
Apology, Occasioned by the Late Unhappy Turn of Affairs, With Relation to Publick
Credit (London, 1720), where John Hammond speaks of stocks "dissolving and
sinking into their Original Nothing" (5).
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In effect, dishonest projectors sell only words:
So have I seen Shares in Joint-Stocks, Patents, Engines,
and Undertakings blown up by the air of great Words,
and the Name of some Man of Credit concerned, to £100
for a 500th. Part, or Share, some more, and at last
dwindle away, till it has been Stock-Jobbed down to 10,
12, 9, 8 1. a Share, and at last no Buyer; that is, in short,
the fine new word for Nothing-worth. (12-13)
In the market, words made of air collapse, but not before
jobbers counterfeit a project's worth.^ Hhe: Essay warns "those
who wou'd not be Tricked out of their Estates by such
Pretenders to New inventions" (14). Thus this tract supporting
invention wields a counter-discourse on linguistic misinvention,
the projection onto words of "meaning" that (like clouds)
disappears. The Essay is concerned with a type of reverse
performative, words that speak into existence that which is not,
"Conceptions which dye in the bringing forth, and (like
Abortions of the Brain) only come into the Air, and dissolve"
(4)Dead-on-arrival projects are dead ab initio, but mimic life.
The desperate projector
finds no remedy but to paint up some Bauble or other, as
Players make puppets talk big, to show like a strange thing,
and then cry it up for a New Invention; gets a Patent for
it, divides it into Shares, and they must be Sold. (34)
Projectors' neologisms, like ventriloquists' words, dislocate
provenance, imputing intrinsic worth to painted Baubles.
' Balloon-words mm up again. In the Review, VI, #30, 11 June 1709, 120, Defoe
observes that stock-jobbers "added 625,000 1. of Air-Money to the Bank, they give
a new imaginary value to the Stock—and what is the Consequence, but whenever
they please, they can with the same Breath of their destructive Mouths blow away
this, and carry away 625,000 1. more of real Value along with It?"
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Dummy projects hide manipulation, arousing the "Ambition of
some honest Coxcomb...wheedl'd to part with his Money" (34).
Projectors with patents privatize misrepresentation with a
communal stamp, suggesting that an "Innovation" (and hence
the words that puff it) meets a standard of communal "Advan
tage." The ability to evade proper supervision, so that language
is unconstrained, surfaces as a vice that the Essay's logic
compounds when applied to linguistic reformation. At this
point, exclusion of projectors' speech from stern appraisal
precipitates a cascade of ironies: lax supervision, trumped by
lack of punishment, topped off by arrogance. The coxcomb
who "part[s] with his Money" is "left to carry on the Project,
and the Projector laughs at him." "Then good night Patent and
Invention-, the Projector has done his business, and is gone"
(34-35).
The evanescence of project, projector, and puffery instanti
ates the text's governing metaphor. Just as the Essay cites the
market for production of New-Nothings, it cites the English
language as such a market, vulnerable to linguistic projectors
who debase the stock of words. Words whose meaning
dissipate—in the market, in the community of anglophones—
are the focus of the Essay's animus, connecting depredations of
jobbery with the country's linguistic decay. Defoe's proposal
for a Society to establish—to impose—standard English jibes
with his economics: in each case, Defoe resists upstart,
destabilizing words. He resists an unconstrained privatization
wherein the speaker's meaning is not shared within a commu
nity of discourse. Projecting enei^ that circulates through the
Essay is reined in at the level of language, which must itself be
the object of a project to restrain (linguistic) projecting.' That
' Defoe's proposal for a Society to determine appropriate standards for English was
not a new idea, even for him. The Essay recycles a suggestion, and indeed some
of the very prose, which appeared in his "Prefatory Discourse" to the 1688 English
Grammar published by Guy Miege. In Defoe's Life (104-05), Bastian also examines
Defoe's 1684 association with an aristocratic society intended to refine the
language. On the early history of proposals for an institution to purify and
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Defoe's proposal for linguistic reform was part of a summa on
projecting, rather than standing alone (as did other such
projects), reflects its rhetorical, logical engagement with the
discourse of emergent capitalism. In the Essay, decayed English
diction and projectorial (mis)representation ("blown up by the
air of great Words") resonate within a single problematic:
words that have ceased to be stable, transparent.
In establishing the basis for his proposed Society, Defoe
invokes the manipulation and debasement common to
marketplace speech. He cites the same bogeyman, innovation:
The Work of this Society shou'd be to encourage
Polite Learning, to polish and refine the English Tongue
...to puige it from all the Irregular Additions that Ignor
ance and Affectation have introduc'd; and all those
Innovations in Speech, if I may call them such, which
some Dogmatic Writers have the Confidence to foster
upon their Native Language. (233)
Such new words are homologous with economic NewNothings; both consist in mere fancy, "as if their [the
Dogmatic Writers'] authority were sufficient to make their own
Fancy legitimate" (233). In a stark desublimation of metaphor,
he imputes to authors "the Impudence to Coin" (236) words.
conserve English, see B. S. Monroe, "An Enghsh Academy," Modem Philology 8
(1910), 107-22; and Edmimd Freeman, "A Proposal for an Enghsh Academy in
1660," Modem Language Review 19 (1924): 291-300. All such seventeenth-century
proposals were essentially ineffective, and more or less lacking in detail. The
exception was one made by John Evelyn to a committee of the Royal Society in
1665, which made substantial provision for establishing, but not regulating the
language (see Monroe, 110-11). After the Restoration, such proposals always (as
does Defoe's) invoke the French Academy as an inspiration if not a model. For
a discussion of the psychology of language reform, including an examination of
how particular groups are cited as sources of linguistic corruption, see Richard W.
Bailey, Images of English; A Cultural History of the Language (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1991), 237-66.
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The Society's "Voice" would function as a type of voice-over,
dispelling innovative trcpes in English:
The Voice of this Society should be sufficient
Authority for the Usage of Words, and sufficient also to
expose the Innovations of other mens Fancies; they
shou'd preside with a Sort of Judicature over the Learning
of the Age, and have liberty to Correct and Censure the
Exorbitance of Writers, especially of Translators. The
Reputation of this Society wou'd be enough to make
them the allow'd Judges of Stile and Language; and no
Author wou'd have the Impudence to Coin without their
Authority.'® (127)
Defoe's attack on dishonest projectors cites "Innovation" as
ephemeral, and for that reason deceptive. Language deployed
by such projectors, like their falsely innovating projects, is
dissipative, devolving into discourse for which the projectors
could not be held to account ("they leave the Cloud to vanish
of it self, and the poor Purchasers to Quarrel with one
another"). Constructing an homology between English usage
and dishonest projecting, Defoe sets put to reverse unaccountability for English usage." He observes that innovative, fanciful.
In the late seventeenth century, the verb "to coin" was bi-valent. The Oxford
English Dictionary (1989) states that it meant "to make (money) by stamping," "to
make (metal) into money by stamping pieces of definite weight and value with
authorized marks or charaaers." But it also meant "to make, devise, produce,
especially in a bad or deprecatory sense: to fabricate, invent, make up (something
specious, pretentious, counterfeit)." Defoe deploys these antithetical meanings,
absolving upstart authors from coimterfeiting only upon receipt of the Society's
permission to "coin." The Oxford English Dictionary points out that to "coin" also
applied to linguistic enterprise, "to frame or invent (a new word or phrase)."
" Defoe's homology, reified in his counterfeiting metaphor, reflects the metaphoric
fertility of the money/language equation studied by Roland Barthes in S/2 (New
York: Hill & Wang, 1974), Michel Foucault in The Order of Things: An
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), and Sandra
K. Fischer in Econolingua~A Glossary of Coins and Economic Language in
Renaissance Drama (Newark: Delaware University Press, 1985). Such equation
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clipped, and counterfeit words are projected onto English,
debasing linguistic exchange. The exchange between English
and other languages is "especially" corrupt.
The Society, however, will speak with the "Voice" of an
"Honest Projector...who having by fair and plain principles of
Sense, Honesty, and Ingenuity, [brings] any Contrivance to a
suitable Persecution, makes out what he pretends to, [and] picks
no body's pocket" (35). In the metaphorical exchange pursued
by Defoe (jobbery/English usage), the Society functions as a
mint, stamping words (and style in general) with an authority
that attests to their worth, their ability to pay off in clarity and
good sense. Words approved by the Society would not be
simulacra, floating in a regime of authorial self-indulgence.
The paradox of Defoe's zeal to expel "impudent" innovation
is that it elevates the Society into an innovator. Defoe states
that
Custom, which is now our best Authority for Words,
wou'd always have its Original here, and not be allow'd
without it. There shou'd be no more occasion to search
for Derivations and Constructions, and 'twou'd be as
Criminal then to Coin Words, as Money. (236-7)

continues to resonate in Defoe's oeuvre. In The Anatomy of Exchange Alley
(London, 1719), Defoe attacks stock-jobbers for "Coining false News" that appeals
to the "Weakness of those, whose imaginations they have wrought upon" (4).
False news, circulating through the economy like false coin, hterally impoverishes
all who receive it, since they take a simulacrum for the real. In An Appeal to
Honour and Justice (London, 1715), Defoe casts his own name as a fictionalized
representation that has been commodified and sold by fraudulent salesmen: "no
Man ever suffer'd under so much as myself...my name had been hackney'd about
the Street by Hawkers, and about the Coffee Houses by the Politicians, at such a
rate, as no patience could bear." See The Shakespeare Head Edition of the Novels and
Selected Writings of Daniel Defoe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1927, rpt. 1974), DC,
189-238, 229. It appears that no other seventeenth-century proposal for conserving
English engages this language/money exchange.
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If words may be coined (that is, counterfeited) like money, then
Defoe's own rhetoric partakes of this equation. Defoe "coins"
Custom, collapsing its meaning (as signifier of communal
acceptation) into the Society's originary jurisdiction (which
retrieves custom from the community). Custom is rendered
contingent, ceasing to be definitively communal, a matter of
accretion and consent.'^ It becomes instead a function of obiter
dicta. In the sense that Custom loses its meaning, it becomes
a neologism (a counterfeit!) itself." The metaphoric exchange
informing Defoe's rhetoric, which exposes the baseness of newnothing words, infects Defoe's own projects. To justify his case
for the Society, he slips into the vice his case opposes. The
Essay becomes ironic, a parody of itself. Apparently Defoe
cannot resist the projecting mentality he has defined, innovating
upon "Custom" to advance his polemic for renovating English.
"Custom" becomes a type of good face, mounted on a
project to monopolize the vernacular and curtail authors'
liberty to interpret style, foreign language, and even linguistic
trends. As the "original" of custom, the Society is a restraint
on trade, displacing rival linguistic proprietors." Its rationale
In New Test of the Sense of the Nation (London, 1710), Defoe himself defines
Custom: "What is it that we call CUSTOM, but the Sence of the Nation. Or, the
common Acceptation, in which, such, and such Things are generally received" (7).
" The Society's custom-creating claims contrast with the more modest, albeit
prescriptive view of custom espoused by Thomas Dyche in A Guide to the English
Tongue (London, 1707). Dyche argues that grammar should reflect the "Custom
of the best Speakers" (49). Likewise, John Jones suggests in Practical Phonography
(London, 1701), that "English Speech is the Art of Signifying the Mind by a
humane Voice, as it is commonly used in England, (particularly in London, the
Universities, or at Court)" (1). The Society's generative authority, stripping
popular practice of legitimacy by virtue of being popular, evinces "how persistently
language theory [in the late seventeenth century] returns to the question of who
controls cultural and textual spaces" (The Material Word, 186) Moreover, if a
word's "Derivation" establishes its external history, defines it as a cultural
phenomenon, then the Society can efface such external traces, legitimating
whatever "Construction" it would maintain.
'•* As sole "Original" of usage/coin, the Society renders usages of other linguistic
proprietors coimterfeit.
In Money, Language, and Thought; Literary and
Philosophical Economies from the Medieval to the Modem Era (Berkeley; University
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is that as mere coiners (counterfeiters), such proprietors do not
generate capital, but debase existing capital by circulating false
tokens. In the unregulated market of words, they authorize
their own Fancy, stamp their false coin with meaningless
valuations. To preserve linguistic capital, the Society would
deface such coin, melt it down, "silence the Impudence and
Impertinence of Young Authors, whose Ambition is to be
known" (237). In the sense that "Young Authors" are their
own projects, the society would write them into new-nothing
ness "like Abortions of the Brain." It would enforce an intergenerational version of Ancients vs. Moderns, in which the
Society, thirty-six "Persons Eminent for Learning" (234),
literally "silences" the young.
However, in authorizing the Society to become the
"Original" of Custom, the phenomenon that the Essay
complains of (innovative self-referring representations) circulates
back in a type of logical double-take. Mobius-like, the Essay
installs innovation, denominating it a type of renovated
Custom. As minted by the Society, Custom becomes a
simulacrum, detached from real custom and referring only to
of California Press, 1982), Marc Shell observes that what "matterfs] in considering
whether a coin is genuine or counterfeit is the issuing authority. A coin as money
is counterfeit when the stated place of origin does not correspond to the actual
place of origin. A counterfeit coin may claim to have and may actually have the
same weight and purity as the legitimate coin of which it is the counterfeit. It is,
however, treason for a private citizen to mint coins" (160). If a usage does not
"have its Original" in the Society, but claims equahty with a society "original," it
cannot be used as a medium of exchange.
" Defoe qualifies the term "learning" by excluding from the Society pedants
"whose English has been far from pohte" (126). If possible, the Society would be
"wholly composed of gentlemen," including "twelve of the nobihty" (127). Intergenerational rivalry is complicated by class prejudice and taste. Such attitude
subsides in the later Defoe, who appreciated the class affiliation and Grub Street
circumstances of authors attempting to break into the market. In Vindication of
the Press (London: 1718), he acknowledged that authors write for pay ("for bread")
and should not be criticized when writing for both pohtical parties (21).
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the Society's diktats}^ In pursuit of linguistic hegemony, the
Society would encompass every linguistic practice, producing
Essays on the Nature, Original, Authorities, and
Differences of Words, on the Propriety, Purity, and
Cadence of Stile, and of the Politeness and Manner in
Writing; Reflections upon Irregular Usages, and Correc
tions of Erroneous Customs in Words; and in short,
everything that wou'd appear necessary to the bringing
our English Tongue to a due Perfection, and our
Gentlemen to a Capacity of Writing like themselves.
(237)
Gentlemen would become "like" members of the Society,
ceasing to be original sites of linguistic generation. Origination
as the prerogative of individuals, entrepreneurs of language,
would cease.Moreover, not only would they be restrained as
inventors, but as practitioners. Should they practice "Erroneous
Customs," enforcing the legitimacy of such usage, their
enforcement authority would be confiscated. The notion that
" The megalomania directed towards origination is thrown into relief by Defoe's
pubhcation, almost thirty years later, of an extensive treatise demonstrating the
slow accretion of writing skills and customs, An Essay Upon Literature: Or, An
Enquiry into the Antiquity and Original of Letters (London: 1726).
Not only does the Society prescribe "Propriety," evicting the common nm of
gentlemen from that determination. Throughout the Essay, the contest over
propriety, which in the late sevententh century was synonymous with "property,"
enacts the contest between the Society and individuals over who shall own the
right to originate linguistic practice. As a bi-valent term, "propriety" concentrates
the money/language exchange central to the Essay's polemic. On the late
sevententh-century meaning of "propriety," see the Orford English Dictionary
(1989), which cites contemporary usages of "propriety" as equivalent of "property,"
for example, "rights of possession or use," "something owned, a possession." See
Defoe's own usage in An Essay on the Regulation of the Press (London, 1703/4), ed.
John Robert Moore (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948), 27: "[F]or every Author
being obhg'd to set his Name to the Book he writes, has, by this Law, an
undoubted exclusive Right to the Property of it. The Clause in the Law is a
Patent to the author, and settles the Propriety of the work wholly in himself."
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custom is legitimating would be acknowledged only insofar as
custom was "customized" by the Society, fitted to the Society's
oxymoronic role as the "Original" of Custom."
The difficulty with collapsing custom into the ab initio is
that it authorizes origination as a source of propriety,
proprietorship, the right to impart authority to words outside
communal supervision. Stock-jobbers claim a like authority.
This potential contradiction is muted, however, in that unlike
the "Clouds" perpetrated by jobbers, "talk'd up" in evanescent
promises, the Society's determinations endure. They are
designed to last, in obiter dicta that bring the language "to a due
Perfection." Indeed, the Society's condemnation of a practice
would discourage jobber-like impositions even from erupting;
"I believe nothing wou'd so soon explode the Practice, as the
Publick Discouragement of it by such a Society" (250). The
pursuit of custom turns society into a sort of panopticon. But
the Society's single, central, corporate perch is "where all our
Customs and Habits both in Speech and Behaviour shou'd
receive an Authority" (250).
This universal inquest into English assumes that custom is a
threat because it leaches value from speech but cannot be given
a local habitation and a name (as "Young Authors" can).
Custom is Everybody, an unaccountable mass. The idea behind
Defoe's assertion that custom is not the desideratum of proper English, and that
language can and should be restrained within boimds that discount contemporary
usage, was a view that prevailed through the first part of the next century.
Johnson's Dictionary (1755) represents a decided shift, in which linguists do not
seek to suppress so much as register and understand changes in English usage. For
a discussion of this shift, see Murray Cohen, Sensible Words: Linguistic Practice in
England 1640-1785 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977),
Chapter 3. While Defoe denigrates crude, chaos-causing "custom," he praises
custom where it imposes order. He cites custom's "authority" in the Review, vol.
I, #38, July 15, 1704, 168. See also vol. I, #74, 18 November 1704, 311. In vol. 11,
#15, 7 April 1705, he observes that "The English Tongue is Entirely govern'd by
Custom" (59), making odd constructions accessible. See also An Essay Upon
Literature, where Defoe argues that languages such as English, "which have no
Authorities for the Usages of Speech," are "legitimated only by Custom." Indeed,
custom prevents confusion among "Words bearing the same Sound" (94-5).
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the Society is that authorized language needs to be made visible
at the point of its generation, so that unauthorized language
does not work its way into custom. The Essay proposes to
draw up the curtain on plays before they are shown to the
world:
All the Disputes about Precedency of Wit, with the
Manners, Customs, and Usages of the Theatre, would be
decided here; Plays shou'd pass here before they were
Acted, and the Criticks might give their Censures and
damn at their pleasure; nothing wou'd ever dye which
once receiv'd Life at this Original: The Two Theatres
might end their Jangle, and dispute for Priority no more;
Wit and Real Worth shou'd decide the Controversy, and
here shou'd be the Infallible Judge. (250)
The object of this extraordinary passage, suggesting a reinstitution of licensing on questions of rhetoric and taste, is to localize
the source of "Manners, Customs, and Usages." Their
uncontrolled generation at an infinitely expandable number of
points would cease. Linguistic conduct would be manageable,
stabilized, the threat of new-nothings overcome: "nothing
wou'd ever dye which once received Life" from the Society.
Rival linguistic proprietors, the two theaters, would make no
counterclaims either against the Society or each other, subdued
by prior review. The model of language proposed is devolutionary toward some single, contemporary source, since "there
shou'd be no more occasion to search for Derivations" (236-7).
The idea of linguistic time—an Alpha of origin, an Omega in
the incalculable (radically changed) future—is abolished.
Such abolition is constructed through an extended conceit:
language and money are not only metaphorically equivalent,
but under threat from new, debasing impositions (rhetoric
dissipates money, "coining" dissipates style) perversely accepted
in everyday exchange. I suggest that the Essay tropes language
and money—demonizing acquiescence in debased exchange—not
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to profit from the "interest" of a complex metaphor, but to
invoke the recoinage crisis of the 1690's, attributing to the
Society the touted "publick Advantage" of its settlement. In
Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England,
Joyce Appleby examines the crisis, demonstrating that two
ideologies conflicted over the valuation of money:
For two years [1694-96], contending pamphleteers
addressed themselves to the question of whether money
derived its principal value extrinsically from its being legal
tender or strictly from its intrinsic, specie content.
In this regard, John Locke's Further Considerations Concerning
Raising the Value of Money (1695), urged (along with his other
•writings) that money and silver were equivalent (i.e., money
had an "intrinsic," unwavering value derived from popular
consensus as to the value of silver).^" The weight of silver in a
shilling constituted its value, albeit such value was imaginary.
The masses of clipped shillings passing for "shillings" therefore
debased the money supply, lowering its total value. Yet, as
Appleby points out, "the fact that coin was legal tender added
value to the silver content as the acceptance of clipped shillings
had demonstrated....Locke's opponents were willing to start
•with the evidence that coin had a source of value in addition to
its silver or gold content" (222-23). In the view of these
commentators, "an extrinsic value [was] added by sovereign
authority" (228). In this view, the value of a shilling (even a
clipped one) was based on accidentals, not essences; on
" Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 220. See generally ch. 8, "A Crisis
Over Money." See also Peter Laslett, "John Locke, the Great Recoinage, and the
Origins of the Board of Trade: 1695-1698," William and Mary Quarterly 14 (1957),
378-85, and J. Keith Horsefield, British Monetary Experiments, 1650-1710
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
In "'Sure I have seen that face before,'" James Thompson discerns Locke's theory
of money in the discourse of "face value" in eighteenth-century comedy.
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speculation and behavioral imperatives of the market; on acts
of the sovereign, not natural law. The value of a shilling might
be set irrespective of specie content, it could vary, but it was
constructed empirically {pace Locke) rather than by imagination.
Parliament's response, calling in the old clipped coins and
minting new ones, followed Locke's rationale. In effect, the
value of a shilling would be independent of popular, quotidian
acceptance; it would be set a priori by reference to an assumed
popular imaginary reflected in the coin's real weight. Appleby
explains the political implications: "If money had only an
intrinsic value arising from the universal desire for gold and
silver, then the sovereign's control over the money supply was
minimal, amounting to setting the terms for minting to a
standard determined by universal consensus" (217).
Incorporated at the level of metaphor, the logic of the
recoinage debate—and of the winning side—circulates through
the Essay, justifying recoinage of English usage. The rationale
for a Society to establish Purity and Propriety is bootstrapped
into a quid est demonstrandum, transposing from coinage to
words the Lockean position endorsed by Parliament. In effect,
the Essay suggests that coined words floating through the
language courtesy of "custom," lacking intrinsic value, are
equivalent to clipped coins that must be recalled. It assumes the
value of stable linguistic stock (definite Derivations and
Constructions, an unchanging "due Perfection"), new milled
with unclippable edges that are harder to counterfeit.
Most particularly, the Essay dismisses the authority of
popular acceptation to impart value to words legitimately part
of the language (if not exactly the King's English). Locke had
argued that notwithstanding a coin's face value, its intrinsic
value could be clipped away, and no popular acceptation could
confer a higher value. The Society, like Parliament, would
restore "intrinsic" value; it would not allow "extrinsic" factors
("custom") to elevate sovereign whim or aggrandizing traders (in
linguistic terms, translation). Hence, while claiming to be the
"Original" of custom, the Society's authority is less than it
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might be. The Lockean rationale rationalizes the Society's
originary authority; it appears consistent with popular will, not
as to corrupt, customary (i.e. extrinsic) usage but as to intrinsic
good sense. Published only a year after Parliament's resolution
of the "crisis," the Essay exploits the terms of that resolution,
authorizing its own project for fixing the usage of words.

The linguistic stasis procured by the Society operates to defend
rational communication. The Essay's most far-reaching assault
on linguistic loose cannonry, states that custom can undermine
sense, that even popular constructions may defy natural word
order. The Society polices violations of sense, arresting
disorderly constructions that impair communication. Defoe
cites swearing as specially opposed to a regime of rational
words. Swearing violates an immutable rational order because
it mixes fustian into speech: "there is nothing so Impertinent,
so Insignificant, so Senseless and Foolish, as our vulgar way of
Discourse when mix'd with Oaths and Curses" (239).
Nevertheless, "Custom has so far prevail'd in this foolish Vice,
that a man's Discourse is hardly agreeable without it" (238).
Swearing, then, becomes the test case for the relative merits of
custom and reason, the linguistic formation that (along with
jobbery) supports a theory of linguistic discipline prompted by
anger at Senseless speech:
[W]hen our Discourse is interlin'd with needless Oaths,
Curses, and long Parentheses of Imprecations, and with
some of very indirect signification, they become very
Impertinent-, and these being run to [an] extravagant
degree...become perfectly ridiculous and Nonsense?^
Mid-to-late seventeenth-century conduct books for "gentlemen" routinely
attacked swearing, but as an immoral, unbecoming custom. For example, in The
Gentlemans Monitor (London, 1665), Edward Waterhouse cited "Prophaneness" as
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The Essay expounds the custom/reason dichotomy broached by
swearing on grounds that it attenuates natural word order and
dissipates meaning:
'Tis true, Custom is allow'd to be our best Authority
for "Words, and 'tis fit it should be so; but Reason must
be the Judge of Sense in Language, and Custom can never
prevail over it. Words, indeed, like Ceremonies in
Religion, may be submitted to the Magistrate; but Sense,
like the Essentials, is positive, unalterable, and cannot be
submitted to any Jurisdiction; 'tis a Law to it self....
[T]here is a direct Signification of Words, or a Cadence
in Expression, which we call Sense-, this, like Truth, is
sullen and the same....Thus a man may speak in Words,
but [be] perfectly unintelligible as to Meaning....'2>ul 'tis
the proper Position of Words, adapted to their Significa
tions, which makes them intelligible...the contrary of
which we call Nonsense. (243-45)
r

Like counterfeit coin, swearing dilutes the value of that with
which it mixes—discourse—finally reducing it to the "perfectly
unintelligible." Speech larded with swear-words becomes a
"Cloud," obscuring meaning, dissolving into meaninglessness.
The "Impertinent" nature of swearing (im-pertinent words
pertain to nothing) reifies the Essay's logic, which organizes
metaphor against dissipative speech. When custom is submitted
to reason, reason overcomes the potential of "nothing" to exist,
defeating the liminal materiality of "nothing" which is the
paradox that troubles the Essay. Indeed, Defoe explicitly
denounces swearing as "nothing," evoking new-nothing projects
and the empty representations by which they are "talk'd up":

either a "close and covert hostility against God" or "lend and Meretricious
boulstring out of Immorahty" (245). "Both of these," he asserted, were "abounding
in this time" (246). Defoe's attack on swearing renders it opposite the honest
projector's "fair and plain principles of Sense" (35).
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This Vicious Custom has prevail'd upon Good
Manners too far....'Tis is a Mean to no manner of End;
'tis Words spoken which signify nothing. (236-7)
Swearing is a simulacrum, a self-referential outburst with "no
manner of End" beyond itself. It is the opposite of reasoned
speech intended to communicate.^ It is inconsistent with a
mentalist, conceptualist epistemology, concerned with the
mind's capacity to organize received signs.
Defoe concedes that reason cannot be legislated ("'Tis is a
Law to it self"); but it can be enforced, urged, exemplified,
which is the role of the Society. By discouraging swearing,
thereby supporting reason, the Society supports stability, the
order of words that "is sullen and the same." It opposes the
encroachment of "nothing"—which is not so immaterial that it
cannot confuse—and does so by opposing newfangled departures
from "positive, unalterable" "sense" (130). Hence, the logic of
Defoe's rebuke to swearing comes round to his dismissal of
phony projects. In each case, he invokes (and would curtail)
the tendency of words to evanesce, to fail as "publick,"
accountable phenomena.
Defoe suggests that recognizing a locution as customary
necessarily discredits it. "Customary" language is alien to its
user, not fully a measure of his intent or honor:
'Tis [swearing]yr«rt/es5, for no man is believ'd a jot the
more for all the Asseverations, Damnings, and Swearings
he makes: Those who are us'd to it themselves, do not
believe a man the more, because they know they are so
^ On Locke's idea that words are not merely intended to embody thought, but to
communicate to a listener, see Nicholas Hudson, "Dialogue and the Origins of
Language: Linguistic and Social Evolution in Mandeville, Condillac, and
Rousseau," in Compendious Conversations, ed. Kevin L. Cope, 3-14. In "'Her
Conversation heavenly," Cynthia Wall argues that the structure of Defoe's Essay
is conversational, and that his project for a female Academy is intended to educate
women into conversational fluency.
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customary, that they signify little to bind a man's
Intention; and they who practice them not, have so mean
an opinion of those who do, as makes them think they
deserve no belief. (240-41)
Swearing is dissipative, attenuating intelligibility and credibility.
Because it is "so mean[ly]" regarded, it is not taken at face value
as a mere expletive, a sign of emphasis. Rather, it works
ironically, interpolating a man's speech into "so customary" a
practice that all practitioners inflect the speech-act, degrading it.
The principle is that of false coining, where plug shillings
debase a whole stock. (Defoe does not acknowledge the
resultant conundrum: if a gentleman's address is "hardly agree
able" without swearing, why is the practice held in such
contempt.'). In the Essay's logic, the swearer is not the direct
agent of his intent, but one of a cohort of swearers who
mediate his intent with the ill-repute of swearing. His speech
transmits interference. Custom is not therefore a useful
convention signifying meaning, but a windy diversion
destabilizing one's representations.
In a notable sleight of hand, Defoe combines the notion of
swearing as signifying "nothing," with the notion that swearing
signifies a sort of negative quantity, a false oath. The swearer's
"oath" is bi-valent: it segues from mere nonsense to implying
a possible non-commitment (even perhaps a lie). In any case,
the utterance remains a simulacrum. Practiced swearers view it
as "so customary," so dissociated from personal intent, that it
does "little to bind." Non-practitioners will disbelieve swearers
because their "opinion" of the practice is "so mean." Either
way, the very habituality of swearing, its attainment to the
status of custom, alerts swearers and non-swearers that a
promise/oath accompanied by an expletive/oath is less than a
spontaneous expression of personal intent. Rather, it is more
like a ritualized utterance, a formula dictated by external
protocols. In this regard, swearing (the promise of any
performance, accompanied by "Asseverations, Damnings,"
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expletives) is affiliated to oaths imposed on politico-religious
dissenters, which in the late seventeenth century were fre
quently dismissed as noncredible.^^ In Samuel Butler's Hudibras
(1663-78), for example, which satirizes Puritan pretensions, the
squire Ralpho asserts:
Oaths are but words, and words but wind.
Too feeble implements to bind.
And hold with deeds proportion so
As shadows to a substance do. (2.2.107-10)24
In this passage, the "nothing"-ness of oaths implies their moral
ephemerality, an idea Defoe takes to new metaphysical heights,
suggesting that expletives are an anti-grammar of "nothing"-ness.
Logically viewed, it is impossible to valence windy
^ On the status of religious/political oaths during the late century, see Susan
Staves, Players' Scepters: Fictions of Authority in the Restoration (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 191-251. In Ways of Lying: Dissimulation,
Persecution, and Conformity in Early Modem Europe (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1990), Perez Zagorin examines casuistical practices in England
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that encouraged disbelief in oaths.
See chapters 9 and 10. See also J. Douglas Canfield, Word as Bond in English
Literature from the Middle Ages to the Restoration (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1989), which in a series of discussions demonstrates literary
disenchantment with oath-taking in the late seventeenth century.
Compare John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester's address to a reified Nothing in his
poem, "Upon Nothing" (1680):
The great Mans gratitude to his best Friend,
Kings Promises, Whores Vows, towards thee they bend.
Flow swiftly into thee, and in thee ever end.
In Word As Bond, Canfield cites the wittiiiess of "religious expletives" in
Restoration comedy, noting that their "moribtmd status indicates the emptiness of
such language" (74). With regard to Drydsn's Marriage A La Mode (1672), Canfield
observes, "The entire world of the play appears to be one marked by absence: of
God, of order, of love, of meaning to all the words that bind society together"
(75-6). He notes that in Etherege's The Man of Mode (1676), the libertines "use
religious language casually and insouciantly, as in their constant, meaningless
expletives" (112).
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asseveration with a potential lie, since making no sense
precludes dissimulation (making sense dishonestly). Presum
ably, Defoe's scheme allows for degrees of "nothing" that
accommodate false seeming. Moreover, insofar as Defoe is
suggesting that a sworn oath represents no intent, but is only
a customary, formulaic response, his argument holds together.
In any event, by associating swearing with broadly based,
habitual behavior—custom—the Essay finesses the issue of
whether (in fact) sworn oaths inflect a person's actual intent
(assuming there is one). Rather Defoe focuses on how oaths are
perceived, suggesting it is the low "opinion" of swearing that
damns "Damning." He seeks to prove that habitual locutions
do not constitute a code, conveying discrete parcels of readily
apprehensible, conventional data. Rather, they provoke the
hearer's routine perception of disembodied words with no (or
at best an uncertain) relation to the speaker's convictions and
sense of responsibility. As such, swearing is an instrument of
rhetorical irony. It generates shared, even ubiquitous locutions
("a man's discourse is hardly agreeable without it" [128]), but it
is the object of resistance, the enemy of "sense," the signifier of
unreliability. The social consensus that confers a certain cache
on swearing is, like swearing itself, bi-valent, since there is a
consensus among swearers and non-swearers to discredit the
practice.
Since swearing subverts meaning and credibility, the custom
of swearing must be abandoned. Polite usages prescribed by the
Society can return discourse to sense and apparent honesty.
Custom can resurface as a new "Original," fixed by a rhetorical
elite. Defoe imagines an exchange between the new and the
customary not much different from that between a melt-down
of old coins and the minting of new ones, preserving old values
in more stable, trustworthy artifacts. Despite the bi-valent
double-takes inherent in his argument, there is a sense in which
custom—though embodying the devalued—will ultimately stand
for value against the crassly new. So long as custom is depopularized, reissued by the Society as a new/old phenomenon
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with "publick Advantage," it can provide a gauge of discursive
"Propriety."

While Defoe never succeeded with this logically tortuous
project, he recurred to it, though without explicitly linking
scapegrace prose and money. In 1710 he observed (with selfproclaimed irony) that a "new" "custom" had deprived political
oaths of signification.^' Under such a regime—where words
mean nothing and lying is impossible—"the Honesty and
Integrity" of oath-takers "may be clearly defended" (3). A New
Test of the Sence of the Nation cites byzantine zig-zags in dynastic
allegiances, but aligns them under a "New System in all our
Politicks" which permits men to "solve all the strange
Phenomena...^h\c\\ have so long puzzl'd our People, and laid
stumbling Blocks in the way of Honest Men" (11). Honesty
bypasses such blocks because under this new system it is
"preposterous to expect, that Men shou'd be suppos'd to mean
the same thing to Day, that they meant yesterday by the same
Words" (2). Popular acceptance of discursive discontinuity
makes it a norm. It makes it the Sence of the Nation,
sanctioned by "Custom...the great Arbiter of the Meaning of
Speech" (3).
Under "a new Tyranny of Custom," words have capricious
meanings
such as were never heard of before: By which, for
Example, a Sacheverellite and a Jacobite, a Mad-Juror and a
Non-Juror, a High-Flyer and a French-Papist are become
" While the tract's irony could hardly be missed, Defoe added a postscript avowing
that "what has been said is Ironical" (79), that he is not in favor of this "new
advanc'd System" (13). On Defoean irony, see Maximillian Novak, "Defoe's Use
of Irony," in The Uses of Irony, ed. Maximillian Novak and Herbert Davis (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), 7-38.
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synonimous, and signify the same Thing; nor are the
Etimologies or Vulgar Acceptations of the Words to be
alter'd, or their Agreement to be interrupted by the
Casual Intervention of Taking or Refusing Oaths,
Abjurations, Associations, or any such Trifles upon any
Account whatsoever. The Reason is plain, for such is the
Sence of the Nation. (4)
Custom becomes the virtual mirror-image of the Essay's Society.
It defies "Etimologies"; under the Society there is "no more
occasion to search for derivations" (127). It authorizes
Agreement of incompatible terms; under the Society there is
"no more occasion to search for...constructions" (127). In the
most telling departure, illogic is installed by Custom-as-female,
opposite the thirty-six "gentlemen" who compose the Society:
All this is brought to pass, by the Wonderful
Assistance, and Irresistable Force of CUSTOM, which, by
her absolute Authority in the Kingdom of Speech, has
full Power to cause what Constructions she pleases to be
put upon Words, and to cause them to be understood as
best may serve to her Royal Ends and Purposes;—making
those Constructions become The Sence of the Nations. (4)
If the all-male Society stabilizes meaning ("nothing would ever
dye which once received Life at this Original"), Custom, as the
female Sence of the Nation, imposes a whimsicality consistent
with gender norms. It hardly needs stating that "in the history
and sociology of inter-sexual perception...masculine minds
constantly symbolize the changable, the unpredictable and the
imaginative as feminine. In this context, I would argue that
Defoe's female Custom is sister to his Lady Credit, her exact
J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), 99. On imputations of female whimsicality, see also
Felicity Nussbaum, The Brink of All We Hate: English Satires on Women 1660-17S0
(Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 1984).
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contemporary, who careers "despotickly" through Defoe's
Review as the embodiment of marketplace caprice:
'Tis a strange thing to think, how absolute this Lady is;
how despotickly governs all her Actions: If you court
her, you lose her, or must buy her at unreasonable Rates;
and if you do, she is always jealous of you, as Suspicious;
and if you don't discharge her to a Tittle of your
Agreement, she is gone, and perhaps may never come
again as long as you live; and if she does, 'tis with long
Entreaty and abundance of Difficulty.^^
Insofar as Custom and Lady Credit are valences of the same
gendered paradigm, each importing caprice into the processes of
exchange, it is possible to see a submerged, indirect link
between language and money in A New Test. Lady Credit, a
major figure in Defoe's journalism, appeared regularly in the
Review in the period in which A New Test appeared. An
oblique reference to her ability to upset marketplace exchanges
powerfully supports the case against Custom.
In A New Test of the Sence of the Nation, Custom permits
words to vaporize, to become the type of nonce-words attacked
by Defoe in the Essay.
Two Men may turn Back to Back in the great Road of
Allegiance, and One Travel, that is, Swear, one Way, One
another; and marching on strait forward meet at the
same Point of Truth and Sincerity....[Tjhis is only by
Custom stepping in, and legitimating the Word SWEARING,
and JESTING, to mean the same Thing in The Sense of the
Nation. (5)

^ Review, vol. HI, #5 (10 January 1706), 18. Lady Credit was a prominent figure
in the iJet/ietf from 1709-11. See Sandra Sherman, "Lady Credit no Lady: Or, the
Case of Defoe's 'Coy Mistress,' truly stat'd," Texas Studies in Literature and
Language 37 (1995): 185-214.
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The politics of swearing allegiance is reduced to comedy,
"Jesting," with approval from all sides. As in the Essay, Defoe
analogizes personal and political speech. In each case, custom
dissipates meaning: "Custom governs Kingdoms as well as Men,
and directs you to take all the Imprecations and Execrations of
the Common Conversation of Men to signify nothing at
all....The Sence of the Nation has long since taken away all
Signification from the most violent Oaths in the World in
common Speech, as Things that neither are intended, or shou'd
be understood to have any Kind of Meaning at all in them" (8).
Bringing his argument down to cases, Defoe observes how
oaths to God are "a Support to Parties, and a Property to
Hypocrites" (11). Yet, mirabile dictu, "the Language...really
signifies Nothing,—is receiv'd without Thinking, administer'd
without Meaning, and stands for a Cypher" (11). The reason is
that:
CUSTOM has declar'd, that all those Politick Oaths are
taken as having no Signification; That we are to
understand them, and the Takers of them to have no
Meaning at all....It is evident, these Gentlemen take all
these Sacred Pledges of Honour given by Her Majesty, to
be like their own Swearing,—•yiz. to be taken for
NOTHING, to have no Manner of Signification...and that
this is the Sence of the Nation. (12)
Custom operates to replace sense, "Meaning" with anti-sense, a
Sence of the Nation that sanctions the absence of meaning.
This "Sence" is not mere indifference, but a coherent outlook,
a "Glorious System" (5), wherein language is continually
processed to stand "for a Cypher." The radical instability or
words in this System allows their realignment into a running
tally of zero-sums: "a Man may sail North and South at the
same Time in the great Ocean of Politicks" (5). Custom, like
Lady Credit, is the agent of impermanence. Unlike her,
however, she is indulgent, casting men's meanest acts as
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Honest?^ The nightmare projected by A New Test is a kind of
new-speak, in which for calculated, rational purposes society
agrees to suspend linguistic integrity. Words cease to be
instrumental, to have a meaning beyond mere utterance. In the
grand scheme of things, however—in the System—dishonesty
towards words makes nominal Honesty among speakers. Defoe
perceives the usefulness of useless words, and charges everyone
with perceiving it.
If there is a shift between an Essay and A New Test as regards
the posture of Custom, it is that the later tract acknowledges
the use of an abhorrent custom even though disdaining it. This
slippage in Defoe's rationale, this accommodation of social
fictions, blunts Defoe's claim that his praise for the Sence of the
Nation is ironic. In a certain "sense" Custom is portrayed as a
more "Glorious" Lady Credit: she is more dependable and
procures a tempered peace. She allows the business of state to
run on, if not exactly to elicit meaningful discursive exchange.
In this posture. Custom—sanctioning the disruption of utterance
and intent—becomes a fixture of Defoe's mature oeuvre,
working its way back to explicit connection with monetized
exchange. In The Compleat English Tradesman (1725), Defoe
opined:
CUSTOM indeed has driven us beyond the limits of our
morals in many things, which trade makes necessary, and
which we cannot now avoid; so that if we must pretend
to go back to the literal sense of the command, if our
yea must be yea, and our nay nay; if no man must go
beyond, or defraud his neighbor; if our conversation
must be without covetousness, and the like, why then it
is impossible for tradesmen to be Christians, and we must
unhinge all business...in short, we must shut up shop and
As to Lady Credit, Defoe admonishes: "if you will entertain this Virgin, you
must act upon nice Principles of Honour, and Justice." Review, vol. VIE, #116, (21
December 1710): 463.
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leave off trade, and so in many things we must leave off
living.2'
In this passage, no ironic demurrer undercuts the utility of a
CUSTOM sanctioning words of uncertain intent. The irony is
rather in Defoe's own "progress," from attacking custom in An
Essay Upon Projects to condoning it on similar grounds almost
thirty years later. In between, Defoe wrote Robinson Crusoe,
Moll Flanders, A Journal of the Plague Year, Roxana, and similar
fictions claiming to be true. He learned the value of endorsing
a suspension of disbelief.
In arguing that "we cannot now avoid" suspicious locutions
(much less should we try to dispel them), Defoe suggests that
"conversation" requires mis-communication verging on non
communication; it is a chancy exercise, every man for himself;
maybe "Yes" means "No." Though the scene has changed
(stock-jobbers wear aprons, stand behind counters), the milieu
is again that of the linguistic entrepreneur. Conversation is
vindicated, but it is perverse, unaccountable. Damn!
^ The Compleat English Tradesman (London, 1725), I, 234-5.

